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We use the methodology of Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha (2003)
to calculate the degree of insurance among the Japanese prefectures.
Prefectural-level data for fiscal years 1975 to 1999 are used to analyze 
the impact of idiosyncratic shocks to regional income. The results indicate
that about 20 percent of idiosyncratic shocks to regional income are
absorbed by inter-regional income insurance through the capital market,
about 10 percent is absorbed by the national government through the
inter-regional tax transfer system, and about 60 percent is absorbed as a
result of changes in saving and dissaving.
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Even after the successful launch of the euro on January 1, 1999 and the circulation of
euro-denominated banknotes and coins in January 2002, many economists and 
policymakers are still concerned with a difficult question: exactly how should a central
bank react to region-specific shocks within a monetary union? In response, economists
have conducted numerous empirical analyses regarding the necessity of central fiscal
policy to guard against asymmetric shocks, particularly using state-level data in the
United States (see Kletzer and von Hagen [2000] and Mélitz [2004, section 1] for a
recent review). These studies have generally indicated that fiscal transfers may be 
significant in some existing monetary unions, but it is nevertheless difficult to conclude
how important it is in practice for the stabilization of the regional economies. 
As part of this body of work, Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) (hereafter,
ASY [1996]) propose a straightforward method for estimating the degree of regional
income and consumption smoothing via insurance and credit. Their method 
essentially comprises the decomposition of cross-sectional variance in gross U.S. state
product into four parts: fractions of shocks to gross state product smoothed via 
capital markets, fractions of shocks to gross state product smoothed by the federal 
fiscal system, fractions of shocks to gross state product smoothed by credit markets,
and an unsmoothed residual fraction. According to ASY (1996), over the period
1963–90, 39 percent of shocks to gross state products are smoothed via capital 
markets, 13 percent are smoothed by the federal government, and 23 percent are
smoothed by credit markets. The remaining 25 percent are unsmoothed.
Mélitz and Zumer (1999) propose some modifications to the methods by ASY
(1996), but U.S. data from 1964 to 1990 yield results similar to ASY (1996).
Likewise, pooling estimates based on Canadian data from 1962 to 1994 also support
the findings of ASY (1996): 30 percent of shocks to gross provincial products are
smoothed via capital markets, 8 percent are smoothed by the federal government,
and 25 percent are smoothed by credit markets. However, the pooling estimates
using U.K. data from 1972 to 1996 and Italian data from 1984 to 1992 do not
yield statistically significant estimates of shocks smoothed either by the federal 
government or by credit markets. 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha (2003) (hereafter KSY [2003]) go one step 
further to investigate the empirical relation between risk sharing and specialization in
production (i.e., the supply side of the economy). KSY (2003) consider various groups
of regions and countries (U.S. states, the Japanese prefectures, European Community
countries) and (1) calculate the degree of insurance among members of the group, 
(2) compute an index of industrial specialization for each region within the group, and
(3) check whether a high degree of insurance within a group is associated with high 
specialization of regions. They find that there is more risk sharing among regions within
countries than among countries, and that regions within countries are more specialized
than countries as a whole. Regarding Japan, KSY (2003) use Japanese data from 1975
to 1993 and find that 21.6 percent of shocks to gross prefectural product are smoothed
via capital markets and only 2.7 percent are unsmoothed. KSY (2004) provide 
a summary of the literature and report updates based on the data up until 1999. 
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evidence from the European economies.
In this paper, we employ the methodology of KSY (2003) to calculate the degree 
of insurance among the Japanese prefectures.
1 Our contribution is novel because we 
(1) use the more recent data up to 2001 to update their results, (2) try to use various
combinations of macroeconomic variables employed for estimation, (3) examine the 
subsample properties of estimates of the shocks smoothed via capital markets and by
the national government and credit markets, and (4) employ more detailed data to 
provide new estimates of fractions of shocks to gross prefectural product smoothed 
by the national government in Japan, which KSY (2003) do not provide.
In addition, we believe our study is important for at least three reasons. First, 
as suggested by Mélitz and Zumer (1999, 2002) and Mélitz (2004), the analysis 
in this framework might not be robust to the choice of monetary union and macro-
economic variables. It is then useful to examine their methods based on more detailed
Japanese data sets. Second, Japanese macroeconomic data show the slowdown of 
the growth rate after the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s. It is 
then necessary to investigate to what extent the analysis of KSY (2003) is robust to
the choice of sample period. Finally, recent political debate in Japan stresses the need
for more independent regional governments in terms of both regional fiscal policy
and the tax base. This debate requires a reasonable understanding of the current 
situation of risk sharing across the prefectures, especially by means of nationwide 
fiscal policy. For example, is the fraction of shocks to Japanese gross prefectural 
product smoothed via capital markets and credit markets higher or lower than 
those smoothed by the national government? Unfortunately, KSY (2003) do not
examine this owing to data limitations. In the following discussion, we address this
important point.
Importantly, we do not claim that our study is the first to examine Japanese cross-
regional risk sharing, consumption smoothing, or even the correlation between 
saving and investment, since there are many studies that deal with these questions.
For example, van Wincoop (1995) examines the cross-correlation of consumption
and output across the Japanese prefectures in the period between 1970 and 1989.
Iwamoto and van Wincoop (2000) analyze saving and investment relationships
within the Japanese regions from 1975 to 1990, by employing the framework of
Feldstein and Horioka (1980), and find that the correlation is significantly lower
than that for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries.
2 Doi (2000) first applies the methodology of KSY (2003) to Japanese data
from 1956 to 1996. We use more recent data up to 2001.
The paper itself is structured as follows. Section II explains the model first 
proposed by ASY (1996) and the recent KSY (2003) model. Section III discusses the
data sets used in our study. Section IV reports the results of the analysis based on our
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1. See Asdrubali and Kim (2004) for further improvement on methodology using a structural vector autoregression
model.
2. Yamori (1995) and Dekle (1996) also apply the methods proposed by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) to Japanese
regional data.main data set. Section V reports the results of sensitivity testing of the choice of
macroeconomic variables. Section VI summarizes our findings and discusses some
policy implications. Section VII concludes.
II. Model
KSY (2003) use two measures of regional risk sharing. Their method follows pioneer-
ing work by ASY (1996), which proposes a measure to decompose the cross-sectional
variance into the variations smoothed by the capital market, by the federal tax 
system, and by credit markets. The decomposition of period-by-period, cross-sectional
variance in regional income is as below. We define Y1 as regional income without 
any smoothing, such as regional GDP. We assume that Y1 is homogenous nondurable
goods, and that there is no capital gain and capital loss. We define Y2 as regional 
income smoothed only through capital markets, such as regional GNP that includes
dividend, interest, and rental income from other regions. We define Y3 as regional
income smoothed through the national government as well as capital markets, such 
as disposable income (i.e., regional income net of tax and transfer across regions).
Finally, letC be regional consumption.
Consider the identity,
Y1it  Y2it  Y3it Y1it = –– – –– – –– –Cit, (1)
Y2it   Y3it   Cit
where subscript t denotes time, and subscript i denotes the region. Taking logs and
differences, multiplying both sides by  lnY1it and taking expectations, we obtain the
following decomposition of cross-sectional variance in  lnY1it for fixed t. 
Var ( lnY1it) =Cov( lnY1it,  lnY1it −  lnY2it) +Cov( lnY1it,  lnY2it −  lnY3it)
+Cov( lnY1it,  lnY3it −  lnCit) +Cov( lnY1it,  lnCit). (2)
Dividing both sides of the equation by the variance of  lnY1it, we obtain an identity:
1 =  K +  T +  C +  U, (3)
where  K is the ordinary least square (OLS) estimate of the slope in the regression of
 lnY1it −  lnY2it on  lnY1it,  T is the OLS estimate of the slope in the regression of
 lnY2it −  lnY3it on  lnY1it,  C is the OLS estimate of the slope in the regression of
 lnY3it −  lnCit on  lnY1it, and  U is the OLS estimate of the slope in the regression
of  lnCit on  lnY1it.
To measure these four fractions, ASY (1996) suggest the following panel regression:
 lnY1it −  lnY2it = vKt + K lnY1it +  Kit, (4)
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 lnY3it −  lnCit = vCt + C lnY1it +  Cit, (6)
 lnCit = vUt +  U lnY1it +  Uit, (7)
where vjt is a time-fixed effect that captures the within-group undiversifiable fluctua-
tions (j =K, T,C, andU).To estimate equations (4)–(7), ASY (1996) employ regional
GDP per capita forY1 and market-price regional income per capita forY2, market-price
regional disposal income per capita for Y3, and regional retail sales per capita for C
(hereafter we use all the variables on a constant price basis deflated by the regional 
consumer price index [CPI], and a per capita basis without any special notation).
Following ASY (1996), KSY (2003) estimate equation (4) using regional GDP 
for Y1 and regional personal income for Y2. Suppose that Y1 is an exogenous variable,
and that it is composed of homogenous nondurable goods. If the idiosyncratic part 
of fluctuations in Y2 is ex ante perfectly insured within the group, say, by the cross-
holding of assets among regions through the capital market, each region’s Y2 should 
not be affected by the idiosyncratic fluctuations of Y1, and Y2 should be equal to some
constant value captured by vKt. Thus,  K in equation (4) must equal unity. Suppose 
then that Y2 is not perfectly insured within the group. If there is no insurance in Y2, 
then Y2 and Y1 must co-move perfectly, and thus  K will be zero. In this way, the 
fraction of idiosyncratic shocks to Y1 that is absorbed by inter-regional income 
insurance through capital markets is measured by  K.
KSY (2000) consider the second panel regression, which is not analyzed in KSY
(2003), across the regions that constitute a risk-sharing group:
 lnY1it −  lnY3it = vK+Tt +  K+T lnY1it +  K+Tit, (8)
where Y3 indicates income smoothed through the national (federal) government as
well as capital markets, and vK+Tt is a time-fixed effect. In practice, KSY (2000) use
personal disposable income for Y3. The coefficient  K+T in equation (8) measures the
fraction of idiosyncratic shocks to Y1 absorbed not only by capital markets but also 
by the national government; that is, the inter-regional tax transfer system. Since
equation (8) is obtained by summing equation (4) and (5),  T =  K+T −  K measures
the insurance through the national government. KSY (2000) do not estimate equa-
tion (8) for Japan because of the lack of a suitable data series, but we will attempt the
estimation of this equation armed with detailed data sets of prefectural System of
National Accounts (SNA) statistics and our own estimates of personal disposable
income and personal income.
KSY (2003) consider another measure of regional risk sharing. Suppose that the 
representative consumer in each region is risk averse and maximizes his/her lifetime
expected utility from consumption. If the utility function is constant relative risk 
aversion, and all regions have the same discount factor, perfect ex ante risk sharing of
income (namely, consumption equals to income) implies that regional consumption
and income are proportional to aggregate consumption and aggregate income. If full
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then regional consumption is proportional to aggregate consumption. Reason further
that income insurance through capital markets and the national government and 
consumption smoothing are perfect. Then, regional consumption must co-move with
group-wide Y1 as well as group-wide Y2, each region’s consumption should not be
affected by the idiosyncratic fluctuations of Y1, and each region’s consumption should
be equal to vK+T+Ct, a time-fixed effect that captures the nondiversifiable fluctuations 
of within-group Y1. Thus,  K+T+C must be unity in the following regression equation (9),
if there is perfect inter-regional overall income and consumption smoothing:
 lnY1it −  lnCit = vK+T+Ct +  K+T+C lnY1it + K+T+Cit, (9)
whereC is consumption and vK+T+Ct is a time-fixed effect that captures the undiversifi-
able fluctuations of within-group Y1. On the other hand,  K+T+C will be zero with no
income and consumption smoothing. Since equation (9) is the sum of equations (4),
(5), and (6), it is easy to compute the fraction of the idiosyncratic shock smoothed 
by the changes in saving and dissaving typically instigated by the credit markets after
the realization of the idiosyncratic shock once we recognize the role of the national
government by  C =  K+T+C − T −  K.
Let us summarize the relationship with other studies on consumption before 
moving on to the details of the data (see KSY [2004, section 2] for an extensive 
literature review). First, we rearrange equation (9) and obtain the following:
− lnCit = vK+T+Ct + ( K+T+C − 1) lnY1it +  K+T+Cit. (10)
Note that equation (10) is almost the same as Cochrane’s (1991) empirical model,
which assumes full risk sharing, such that ( K+T+C − 1) is zero.
3 Cochrane (1991) 
measures whether the consumption of economies responds only to aggregate shocks 
or not. The focus here is the measurement of the fraction of region-specificY1 shocks
absorbed through the various channels of inter-regional insurance. Second, if we add
the real interest rate to the right-hand side of equation (10) instead of time-fixed
effects, the empirical model is the same as that found in Campbell and Mankiw (1989)
with the “rule-of-thumb” consumers subject to a liquidity constraint. However,
Campbell and Mankiw’s (1989) main motivation is to verify the permanent income
hypothesis, and accordingly they emphasize the time-series direction of the regression,
while our analysis places more emphasis on its cross-sectional direction. Moreover, the
coefficient  K+T+C measures all inter-regional income insurance through capital markets
and the national government as well as the credit market. In this way, we interpret the
degree of overall income and consumption smoothing against the idiosyncratic
regional shock toY1 as measured by three sources: first, the fraction of the idiosyncratic
shock smoothed by cross-holding of financial assets (ex ante insurance) measured by
 K; second, the fraction of the idiosyncratic shock smoothed by net inter-regional
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3. To be precise, Cochrane (1991) used various data series other than income data for the right-hand-side variable,
primarily because he regarded income as endogenous.transfer made by the national government (instigated after the realization of the 
idiosyncratic shock) measured by  T; and third, the fraction of the idiosyncratic 
shock smoothed by the changes in savings and dissavings typically instigated by the
credit markets after the realization of the idiosyncratic shock once we recognize the 
role of the national government, measured by  C. We believe that the estimates of 
the degree of overall income and consumption smoothing against the idiosyncratic
regional shock will help us to measure the effectiveness of inter-regional consumption
and income smoothing in Japan as a currency area. We hope that these results will then
assist the quantitative evaluation of the status quo prior to the debate on the need for
more independent fiscal policies by Japanese regional governments.
III. Data
In this section, we explain the details of the data series used in our study. We require
data on income without any smoothing (Y1), income smoothed only through 
capital markets (Y2), income smoothed through capital markets and the national 
government (Y3), and consumption (C). We use four sets of proxy variables for Y1, Y2,
and Y3. Our preferred statistic to obtain the effects of income smoothing is net 
market-price base variables. Market-price base data are measured by the market 
price, while factor cost base data are market-price base data minus net indirect tax
(indirect tax on products minus subsidies). Net base data and gross base data differ in
their valuations of depreciation cost.
4
We prefer net market-price basis data because the proxy variables for Y1, Y2, and Y3
exclude depreciation cost in a consistent manner for our analytical requirements. Our
preference is not based on any economic model, but solely on the consistency
between statistical definitions of Japanese prefectural SNA statistics, which might
affect the estimates of  K,  T, and  C.
The remaining three data sets include the variables suggested by ASY (1996) and
KSY (2000, 2003). These data sets have some shortcomings in light of the con-
sistency of construction of statistics, and we use them in sensitivity checks. More
specifically, the second data set includes regional GDP and market-price regional
income as suggested by ASY (1996). The third data set collects gross market-price
base variables proposed in KSY (2003). The fourth data set is for the replication of
the results reported by KSY (2003).
A. Benchmark Data: Data Based on Net Market-Price Basis Data
We first construct benchmark data: net market-price data. We begin by defining C
andY3. Then we subtract accounting items that reflect income transfer by the national
government and capital markets to construct Y2 and Y1. We use two consistent 
annual data series on prefectural SNA statistics compiled by the Economic and Social
Research Institute, Cabinet Office of Japan. These data series are the prefectural-level
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4. The accounting item that makes the difference between the gross base data and net base data is “consumption of
fixed capital.” In practice, valuation with depreciation (including consumption of fixed capital) is gross base data,
and valuation net of depreciation (excluding consumption of fixed capital) is net base data.counterpart of the national income account. The first series is available from fiscal 
1990 (hereafter all years refer to the Japanese fiscal year, which runs from April to
March of the following year) to 2001, and is based on the 1993 SNA methodology.
The second series is from 1975 to 1999, and is based on the 1968 SNA methodology.
Regarding consumption data, we use total final consumption expenditure (the
sum of private final consumption expenditure and government final consumption
expenditure) for C, because we make the assumption that each prefecture is an 
economic agent. The data series on total final consumption expenditure is available
in the prefectural SNA statistics.
As for data on Y3, we use prefectural disposable income data for Y3, because prefec-
tural disposable income is income data smoothed through the capital markets as well
as the federal tax and transfer. In practice, we use disposable income in the prefectural
SNA statistics for prefectural disposable income data. 
Y2 is prefectural disposable income, Y3, less the national government’s income
transfers, which are specifically referred to as “other net transfers” in the SNA statis-
tics. Because, as the first and second rows in the upper panel of the Figure 1 show,
prefectural disposable income is the sum of “other net transfers” and market-price
prefectural income, market-price prefectural income is Y2, income smoothed through
the capital markets.
Y1 is Y2 minus income transfer through the capital markets, which is referred to 
as “net factor income transfer from outside the prefecture” in the SNA statistics.
5
Because, as the second and third rows in the upper panel of Figure 1 show, the sum of
market-price prefectural income Y2 and “net factor income transfer from outside the
prefecture” is prefectural net domestic product (NDP), Y1. In practice, we estimate 
prefectural NDP by subtracting consumption of fixed capital from prefectural GDP, 
as the third and fourth rows of the upper panel of the Figure 1 show. The upper panel
of Figure 1 shows that the three data series in our benchmark data set consistently
include net indirect tax and consistently exclude consumption of fixed capital. Based
on this consistency, we consider that these market-price basis data give us reasonable
estimates of  K,  T, and  C.
Following KSY (2003), we use prefectural CPI as the deflator to obtain constant
values. In addition, all of these data series are adjusted to a per capita basis, using
population data provided in the prefectural SNA statistics.
B. Data Based on GDP and Market-Price Prefectural Income
ASY (1996) suggest the use of prefectural GDP and market-price regional income to
estimate  K. To follow this suggestion, we make one change in our choice of variable
compared with our baseline data set. Regarding Y1, we use prefectural GDP, rather
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5. Net factor income transfer from outside the prefecture includes not only capital income but also labor income
transfer. Around a large city area, it is quite plausible that a worker might earn earnings from a business in the
neighboring prefecture. Therefore, estimates of  K based on this data may not reflect just the smoothing of income
through capital markets.
We aggregate the prefectures around the large economic centers to cope with this problem. We regard the
greater Tokyo region (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama), the Tokai region (Aichi, Gifu, and Mie) and the
Kansai region (Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Shiga, Wakayama, and Nara) as three large prefectures. However, estima-
tion results do not differ much from the ones obtained from our original data set. Therefore, the commuter effect
seems to be negligible.39
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Figure 1  Comparison of Income Data
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Prefectural GDP (Y1)







Prefectural disposable income (Y3)
Prefectural GNP (Y2)
Prefectural GDP (Y1)
[3] Data Based on Gross Market-Price Data (Following KSY [2003])
Notes: NFITOP: Net factor income transfer from outside the prefecture.
PFI: Prefectural factor income.
NIT: Net indirect tax.
ONT: Other net transfers.
CFC: Consumption of fixed capital.than prefectural NDP. We use market-price prefectural income for Y2, prefectural 
disposable income forY3, and consumption data as our benchmark data set does.
We point out one shortcoming in this data set. As the middle panel of Figure 1
shows, the estimates of  K based on this data set include not only the effect of 
net factor income transfer from outside the prefecture, but also the effect of con-
sumption of fixed capital. This is because prefectural GDP contains consumption of
fixed capital, while market-price prefectural income does not. This point is clearly 
demonstrated in the middle panel of Figure 1.
C. Data Based on Gross Market-Price Basis Data
We consider another set of income data to follow the suggestion of KSY (2003). 
We make two changes in our choice of variables compared with our baseline data set.
Regarding Y1, we use prefectural GDP, rather than prefectural NDP. As regards Y2, we
use prefectural GNP forY2, rather than market-price prefectural income.
6
This data set has a similar shortcoming to that of the previous subsection. As the
bottom panel of Figure 1 shows, both prefectural GDP and prefectural GNP include
consumption of fixed capital, while prefectural disposable income does not. Thus,
 K+T measures the effect of consumption of fixed capital in addition to other net
transfers and net factor income transfer from outside the prefecture.
D. Data to Replicate Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha (2003)
To replicate KSY (2003), we use prefectural GDP forY1, prefectural personal income
for Y2, and prefectural personal disposable income for Y3. Note that KSY (2003) 
suggest using alternative macroeconomic variables, given their limitation of data as
we have seen in the previous subsections. Thus, the replication is for the sake of 
comparison only.
On the subject of Y2, prefectural personal income roughly corresponds to market-
price prefectural income distributed to households and private nonprofit institutions
serving households.
7 In practice, we estimate the data series on prefectural personal
income because prefectural personal income is not reported in the prefectural SNA
statistics. The appendix explains the estimation method in detail. WithY3, prefectural
personal disposable income corresponds to prefectural disposable income distributed
to households and private nonprofit institutions serving households minus employer
contributions for social insurance. In practice, as prefectural personal disposable
income is not reported in the prefectural SNA statistics, we must estimate this data
series. The appendix also explains the estimation method in detail.
8
40 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 2005
6. In practice, we use gross national expenditure data series in the prefectural SNA statistics for prefectural GNP data.
7. Prefectural personal income differs from prefectural income in three respects. First, prefectural personal income 
covers only households and private nonprofit institutions serving households, while prefectural income covers all 
the economic agents consisting of nonfinancial corporations, financial corporations, and the government in addition
to households and private nonprofit institutions serving households. Second, prefectural personal income does not
include employer contributions for social insurance, which is included in prefectural income. Third, prefectural 
personal income includes transfer payments to persons minus personal contributions for social insurance, which can
be considered as “other net transfers” other than payment of direct tax.
8. KSY (2003) use prefectural GDP for Y1, prefectural personal income forY2, and prefectural total consumption for
C, obtained from National Accounts Japanese Prefectural Data (Sinfonica) in estimating equations (4) and (9)
using the sample from 1975 to 1993. However, as mentioned above, KSY (2003) do not estimate equation (8) for
Japan because they do not have personal disposable income, which could be used for Y3.E. Summary Statistics
The discussion above shows that our statistically consistent and preferred data set is 
net market-price basis data. The other two data sets are quite likely to yield biased 
estimates. Before moving on to the regression analyses, Tables 1 and 2 provide 
summary statistics for the data. All data series are on a per capita constant price basis,
with annual changes in percentage points. Table 1 shows the summary statistics 
of changes in these variables based on the 1968 SNA. Table 2 shows the summary 
statistics based on the 1993 SNA. Tables 3 and 4 report the correlation matrix based
on the 1968 SNA and 1993 SNA. Data series within the groups of Y1, Y2, Y3, andC are
positively correlated. However, the sizes of correlation coefficients are not uniformly
high even within the group, depending on the choice of accounting methods, such 
as net or gross, or focusing on the entire prefecture or a subset of economic agents 
in a prefecture, and so forth. These results casually suggest that the choice of 
macroeconomic variables affects the results of the following econometric exercise. 
We will see the details in the following sections.
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Min. Max. observations deviation
Y1
Prefectural NDP 898 1.78 3.00 –10.18 14.82
Prefectural GDP 1,128 2.07 2.80 –9.32 14.17
Market-price prefectural income 913 1.95 3.01 –9.76 13.13
Y2 Prefectural GNP 1,128 2.17 2.83 –8.96 16.59
Prefectural personal income 1,126 1.42 3.72 –16.36 16.43
Y3
Prefectural disposable income 788 2.01 2.97 –9.53 17.29
Prefectural personal disposable income 1,126 1.35 3.84 –16.00 15.48
C Total consumption 1,128 2.03 1.93 –5.77 13.80
Note: All the figures are computed based on the change rate of real and per capita data series, and 
all the figures except for the number of observations are on a percentage basis.




Min. Max. observations deviation
Y1
Prefectural NDP 506 –0.15 2.38 –8.02 6.54
Prefectural GDP 517 0.32 2.19 –6.46 6.64
Market-price prefectural income 506 0.02 2.54 –6.80 6.83
Y2 Prefectural GNP 517 0.46 2.34 –5.87 6.02
Prefectural personal income 517 0.18 3.21 –9.97 19.26
Y3
Prefectural disposable income 495 0.50 2.51 –8.26 10.78
Prefectural personal disposable income 517 0.50 3.57 –10.51 9.93
C Total consumption 517 1.50 1.80 –6.45 7.56
Note: All the figures are computed based on the change rate of real and per capita data series, and 
all the figures except for the number of observations are on a percentage basis.IV. Main Results
This section first discusses the details of the empirical estimation. Then it presents the
main results based on net market-price basis data: prefectural NDP forY1, market-price
prefectural income forY2, and prefectural disposable income forY3. Finally, this section
reports the subsample properties of our estimates.
A. Methods of Estimations
Our estimations are constructed as below. First, based on the entire sample, we estimate
equation (4),
 lnY1it −  lnY2it = vKt +  K lnY1it + Kit, 
and obtain the estimates of (100 • K). Second, we estimate equation (9),
 lnY1it −  lnCit = vK+T+Ct +  K+T+C lnY1it + K+T+Cit,
and obtain the estimates of (100 • K+T+C).
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Table 3  Correlation Matrix: 1968 SNA
Y1 Y2 Y3 C
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Y1
Prefectural NDP (a) 1.000
Prefectural GDP (b) 0.986 1.000
Market-price prefectural income (c) 0.888 0.881 1.000
Y2 Prefectural GNP (d) 0.877 0.892 0.986 1.000
Prefectural personal income (e) 0.570 0.586 0.679 0.696 1.000
Y3
Prefectural disposable income (f) 0.798 0.795 0.905 0.891 0.603 1.000
Prefectural personal disposable income (g) 0.504 0.520 0.611 0.624 0.937 0.557 1.000
C Total consumption (h) 0.429 0.461 0.448 0.467 0.351 0.412 0.291 1.000
Note: Correlation coefficients are based on the change rate of real and per capita data series.
Table 4  Correlation Matrix: 1993 SNA
Y1 Y2 Y3 C
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Y1
Prefectural NDP (a) 1.000
Prefectural GDP (b) 0.983 1.000
Market-price prefectural income (c) 0.891 0.891 1.000
Y2 Prefectural GNP (d) 0.882 0.910 0.986 1.000
Prefectural personal income (e) 0.520 0.533 0.651 0.648 1.000
Y3
Prefectural disposable income (f) 0.797 0.797 0.859 0.850 0.576 1.000
Prefectural personal disposable income (g) 0.481 0.500 0.575 0.580 0.892 0.551 1.000
C Total consumption (h) 0.404 0.445 0.416 0.452 0.334 0.411 0.274 1.000
Note: Correlation coefficients are based on the change rate of real and per capita data series.Since the data limitation on prefectural disposable income forces us to reduce the
number of observations available for the analysis, we repeat the analysis using the
observations with prefectural disposable income. For those prefectures, we begin by
estimating equation (4),
 lnY1it −  lnY2it = vKt + K lnY1it +  Kit,
and obtain the estimates of (100 • K). Second, we estimate equation (8),
 lnY1it −  lnY3it = vK+Tt + K+T lnY1it +  K+Tit,
and obtain the estimates of (100 • K+T). Finally, we estimate equation (9),
 lnY1it −  lnCit = vK+T+Ct +  K+T+C lnY1it + K+T+Cit,
and obtain the estimates of (100 • K+T+C). Using the relationship that (100 • K+T+C) −
(100 • K+T) = (100 • C) and (100 • K+T) − (100 • K) = (100 • T), we compute the
individual components of risk sharing.
We estimate equations (4), (8), and (9) in two steps to take the heteroskedasticity
in the error terms into consideration. In the first step, we begin by estimating each
equation separately by OLS, including fixed time effects into the regressor. We then
estimate the variance of the error term in each prefecture from the residuals obtained
from each equation. Armed with those estimates of variance, in the second step we
correct the heteroskedasticity in the error term in each prefecture. Specifically, 
we estimate each equation by weighted least square (WLS) with fixed time effects.
We call this method “WLS1.”
Note that the regressors in the three equations are not common in WLS1, because
the regressors are scaled by the size of variance obtained in each equation. Thus, the
identity of variance decomposition expressed in equation (2) does not hold for WLS1.
9
To solve this problem, we also estimate the three equations based on a common 
variance estimate for each prefecture obtained from the OLS residuals of the three 
equations (4), (8), and (9). In this method, the identity of variance decomposition
holds. We call this “WLS2.”
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9. To cope with this problem, we try to correct correlations in the error terms among the prefectures and equations, 
and autocorrelations in the error terms as suggested by ASY (1996) as follows. First, we estimate the matrix  
of correlation between equations, covariance matrix of prefectures  , and the matrix of time-series autocorrelation
R (assuming autoregressive order of one process) using OLS residuals. Second, we estimate the covariance matrix
of error terms assuming that its structure is expressed by  =   ⊗   ⊗ R, and adjusting the size to meet our
unbalanced observations to conduct the generalized least square estimation. However, our estimate of  turns out
to be non-positive-definite, and our estimate of  does not satisfy the necessary condition for a valid estimate for 
a variance-covariance matrix. This problem may occur because the size of sample in each prefecture is too small to
estimate precise  , as pointed out by ASY (1996).B. Results Based on a Full Sample
We present the results based on net market-price basis data: prefectural NDP for Y1,
market-price prefectural income for Y2, and prefectural disposable income forY3. The
fourth and fifth rows of Table 5 show the results based on the 1968 SNA estimated
by WSL1. We find the estimate of (100 • K) to be 23.9 percent, or 22.0 percent
based on the sample from 1975 to 1999, which is close to the result reported by KSY
(2003) (21.6 percent, 1975–93 data). The estimates of (100 • K+T+C, 91.3 percent or
92.4 percent) are also similar to that of KSY (2003) (97.3 percent, 1975–93 data)
based on the 1968 SNA data. As shown in the ninth and tenth rows of Table 5,
WLS2 provides almost the same estimates. 
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Table 5  Estimation Based on Net Market-Price Basis Data
Capital markets Overall 
Capital markets  and national  income and  Consumption 
Number of 100 • K government  consumption smoothing
regions (percent) 100 • K+T
smoothing 100 • C
(percent) 100 • K+T+C (percent)
(percent)
Y1 Y2 Y3 C
Prefectural Market-price Prefectural  Total 
NDP prefectural disposable  consumption
income income
WLS1
1968 SNA (1)  44 23.9 (1.5) — 91.3 (1.7)
(1975–99)
1968 SNA (2) 41 22.0 (1.6) 30.6 (2.0) 92.4 (1.8) 61.8
(1975–99)
1993 SNA (1)  46 19.8 (1.9) — 87.3 (2.4)
(1990–2001)
1993 SNA (2)  45 19.4 (1.9) 33.0 (2.5) 87.5 (2.5) 54.5
(1990–2001)
WLS2
1968 SNA (1)  44 23.5 (1.7) — 91.0 (1.7)
(1975–99)
1968 SNA (2)  41 22.4 (2.0) 30.5 (2.0) 92.3 (2.0) 61.8
(1975–99)
1993 SNA (1)  46 20.1 (2.4) — 86.6 (2.4)
(1990–2001)
1993 SNA (2)  45 19.1 (2.6) 31.9 (2.6) 87.3 (2.6) 55.4
(1990–2001)
Note: Numbers in parentheses show the standard errors for the parameters. Estimates for 1968 SNA
(1) are based on 898 unbalanced observations, while estimates for 1968 SNA (2) are based 
on 788 unbalanced observations, reduced owing to the lack of prefectural disposable income
data. Correspondingly, estimates for 1993 SNA (1) are based on 506 balanced observations,
while estimates for 1993 SNA (2) are based on 495 balanced observations. The balanced 
observations indicate that all the regions have the same number of observations, while the
unbalanced observations indicate that at least one region does not have the same number 
of observations.To assess the effects of choice of definition of the SNA statistics and sample
period, we compare the estimates based on the 1968 SNA and 1993 SNA, focusing
on the individual magnitude of (100 • K), (100 • T), and (100 • C) estimated based
on WLS2. In the 11th and 12th rows of Table 5, (100 • K) takes only smaller values
based on the 1993 SNA data compared with the 1968 SNA. However, the estimate
of (100 • C) based on the 1993 SNA data takes a smaller value (55.4 percent) than
that based on the 1968 SNA data (61.8 percent). 
Did (100 • C) really fall in the 1990s, or did (100 • C) fall in the 1990s because 
of the changes in statistical measures between the 1968 SNA and the 1993 SNA? 
We will examine the robustness of our findings using subsample periods, rather 
than the entire sample periods for estimation for both the 1968 SNA data and 1993
SNA data.
C. Subsample
To examine whether the decrease in the value of (100 • C) in the 1990s is a statistical
artifact due to the change from the 1968 SNA data to the 1993 SNA data, we com-
pute the values of (100 • K), (100 • T), and (100 • C) in equations (4) to (7) using
the five-year sample periods by WLS2. Regarding the 1968 SNA data, our sample
periods are 1976–80, 1977–81, ... , and 1995–99. Regarding the 1993 SNA data,
our sample periods are 1991–95, 1992–96, ... , and 1997–2001. 
Figure 2 summarizes the results. The upper figure uses 1968 SNA data, and the
lower figure uses 1993 SNA data. The numbers on the horizontal axis represent the
middle year of the sample periods. For example, “1996” means the results based on
the sample from 1994 to 1998. The upper figure shows that, in the early 1990s,
there seems to be a substantial decrease in the size of (100 • C), and overall effects 
of income insurance and smoothing. The lower figure confirms that the size of
(100 • C) is relatively small in the early sample, and increases somewhat as we move
the sample close to 2001. The upper figure also suggests that the size of (100 • T)
and (100 • K) increases somewhat during the period in which we observe the decrease
in (100 • C). Figure 3 plots the cross-sectional standard deviation of each variable.
Cross-sectional standard deviations of consumption seem to be of the same order as
those of prefectural NDP in the early 1990s. That is why, we expect, the degree of
overall risk sharing measured by (100 • K+T+C) decreases. Given the small increase in
(100 • K+T) in those periods, we find lower values of (100 • C).
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Note: We use prefectural NDP data forY1, market-price prefectural income data forY2,
and prefectural disposable income forY3.47
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[2] 1993 SNAV. Sensitivity on the Choice of Macroeconomic Variables
This section presents our results based on GDP and market-price prefectural income
data, gross market-price data, and replication of KSY (2003). Since the estimation
methods are essentially the same as those in the previous sections, we merely present
the results. We only mention the results based on WLS2, because the results are 
similar whether based on WLS1 or WLS2.
A. Results Based on GDP and Market-Price Prefectural Income
The ninth and tenth rows of Table 6 show that based on the 1968 SNA we get 
estimates of (100 • K) of 17.6 percent or 16.6 percent, which are smaller than 
that of KSY (2003) (21.6 percent). The estimates of (100 • K+T+C, 88.9 percent or
90.1 percent) are also close to that of KSY (2003) (97.3 percent) based on the 1968
SNA data. However, our finding is not robust to the choice of definition of SNA 
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Table 6  Estimation with Prefectural GDP and Market-Price Prefectural Income Data
Capital markets Overall income 
Capital markets  and national  and consumption
Number of regions 100 • K government smoothing
(percent) 100 • K+T 100 • K+T+C
(percent) (percent)
Y1 Y2 Y3 C
Prefectural Market-price Prefectural Total 
GDP prefectural income disposable income consumption
WLS1
1968 SNA (1) 44 18.0 (1.8) — 90.3 (1.9)
(1975–99)
1968 SNA (2) 41 15.5 (1.8) 24.6 (2.3) 91.9 (1.9)
(1975–99)
1993 SNA (1) 46 12.4 (2.1) — 83.2 (2.7)
(1990–2001)
1993 SNA (2) 45 12.1 (2.1) 25.3 (2.8) 83.4 (2.8)
(1990–2001)
WLS2
1968 SNA (1) 44 17.6 (2.0) — 88.9 (2.0)
(1975–99)
1968 SNA (2) 41 16.6 (2.2) 25.5 (2.2) 90.1 (2.2)
(1975–99)
1993 SNA (1) 46 11.8 (2.7) — 82.2 (2.7)
(1990–2001)
1993 SNA (2) 45 10.4 (2.9) 24.6 (2.9) 83.3 (2.9)
(1990–2001)
Note: Numbers in parentheses show the standard errors for parameters. Estimates for 1968 SNA 
(1) are based on 913 unbalanced observations, while estimates for 1968 SNA (2) are based 
on 788 unbalanced observations, reduced owing to the lack of prefectural disposable income
data. Correspondingly, estimates for 1993 SNA (1) are based on 506 balanced observations,
while estimates for 1993 SNA (2) are based on 495 balanced observations. The balanced 
observations indicate that all the regions have the same number of observations, while the
unbalanced observations indicate that at least one region does not have the same number 
of observations.statistics and/or sample period. As the 11th and 12th rows of Table 6 suggest,
(100 • K) and (100 • C) take even smaller values based on the 1993 SNA data.
Figure 4 summarizes the results using the subsample period. The upper figure
shows that in the early 1990s there seems to be a substantial decrease in the size of
(100 • C), and overall effects of income insurance and smoothing. The lower figure
also confirms that the size of (100 • C) is relatively small in the early sample, and
increases somewhat as we move the sample close to 2001. The upper figure also 
suggests that the size of (100 • T) and (100 • K) increases somewhat during the
period in which we observe the decrease in (100 • C). 
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Note: We use prefectural GDP data forY1, market-price prefectural income data forY2,
and prefectural disposable income forY3.There is a statistical inconsistency in this data set, because it includes both gross
and net base data; Y1 is gross, while Y2 and Y3 are net. The statistical inconsistency
seems to explain the relatively smaller values of (100 • K) for this data set than those
of our benchmark data set. Nonetheless, estimates obtained from this data set do not
vary much from those obtained from our baseline data set.
B. Results Based on Gross Market-Price Basis Data
Following KSY’s (2003) argument that the best estimate of Y2 is regional-level GNP,
we present the results based on gross market-price basis data: prefectural GDP for Y1,
prefectural GNP for Y2, and prefectural disposable income for Y3. 
From the ninth and tenth rows of Table 7 based on the 1968 SNA, we obtain larger
values of (100 • K), 23.1 percent or 21.3 percent based on the sample from 1975 to
1999, than those reported in Table 6, and close to the result reported by KSY (2003)
(21.6 percent). The estimates of (100 • K+T+C, 90.1 percent or 90.3 percent) are similar
to that of KSY (2003) (97.3 percent) based on the 1968 SNA data. Our findings again
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Table 7  Estimation Based on Gross Market-Price Basis Data
Capital markets Overall income 
Capital markets  and national  and consumption
Number of regions 100 • K government smoothing
(percent) 100 • K+T 100 • K+T+C
(percent) (percent)
Y1 Y2 Y3 C
Prefectural GDP Prefectural GNP Prefectural Total 
disposable income consumption
WLS1
1968 SNA (1)  47 22.3 (1.4) — 90.4 (1.7)
(1975–99)
1968 SNA (2)  41 19.8 (1.5) 26.1 (2.4) 90.8 (2.0)
(1975–99)
1993 SNA (1)  47 16.3 (1.7) — 83.6 (2.7)
(1990–2001)
1993 SNA (2)  45 16.3 (1.2) 25.3 (2.8) 83.4 (2.8)
(1990–2001)
WLS2
1968 SNA (1)  47 23.1 (1.7) — 90.1 (1.7)
(1975–99)
1968 SNA (2)  41 21.3 (2.1) 25.0 (2.1) 90.3 (2.1)
(1975–99)
1993 SNA (1)  47 16.5 (2.5) — 83.2 (2.5)
(1990–2001)
1993 SNA (2)  45 16.3 (2.8) 24.5 (2.8) 83.6 (2.8)
(1990–2001)
Note: Numbers in parentheses show the standard errors for parameters. Estimates for 1968 SNA 
(1) are based on 1,128 balanced observations, while estimates for 1968 SNA (2) are based 
on 788 unbalanced observations, reduced owing to the lack of prefectural disposable income
data. Correspondingly, estimates for 1993 SNA (1) are based on 517 balanced observations,
while estimates for 1993 SNA (2) are based on 495 balanced observations. The balanced 
observations indicate that all the regions have the same number of observations, while the
unbalanced observations indicate that at least one region does not have the same number 
of observations.are not robust to the choice of sample period. As the 11th and 12th rows of Table 7
suggest, (100 • K) and (100 • C) take only smaller values based on the 1993 SNA data. 
Figure 5 summarizes the results using the subsamples. We confirm that the size of
(100 • K) is not robust to the choice of subsample periods in both the 1968 SNA and
1993 SNA. We also find the same decline in the size of (100 • C) around the late
1980s and early 1990s. 
There is a statistical inconsistency in this data set, because it includes both gross
and net base data; Y1 and Y2 are gross data, while Y3 is net. Nonetheless, sizes and
trends of estimates obtained from this data set do not vary much from those obtained
from our baseline data set.
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[2] 1993 SNA
Note: We use prefectural GDP data forY1, prefectural GNP data forY2, and prefectural
disposable income forY3.C. Replication of Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha (2003)
Table 8 shows the results and our replication of KSY (2003) based on the 1968 SNA
(ninth row), and sensitivity tests using a new data series from 1990 to 2001 (10th
row). We point out an important feature.
Our estimates of (100 • K) are very different from those obtained by KSY (2003).
The 12th row of Table 8 shows that the estimate of (100 • K) takes a quite high value
(55.4 percent) compared with the Japanese estimate of KSY (2003) (21.6 percent,
the fourth row), rather close to the U.S. estimate (63.5 percent) reported by KSY
(2003). The estimate of (100 • K+T+C, 88.2 percent) is similar to that of KSY (2003)
(97.3 percent) based on the 1968 SNA data. 
Since our estimate of (100 • K+T) is 58.9 percent, we infer that (100 • T) is 3.5
percent and (100 • C) is 29.3 percent. The role played by (100 • T) of our estimate in
Japan is a little smaller in magnitude than that estimated in the United States by KSY
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Table 8  Replication of KSY (2003)
Capital markets Overall income 
Capital markets  and national  and consumption
Number of regions 100 • K government smoothing
(percent) 100 • K+T 100 • K+T+C
(percent) (percent)
Y1 Y2 Y3 C
KSY (2003)
GDP Personal income Retail sales and 
total consumption
U.S. data 50 63.5 (1.8) — 77.6 (4.5)
(1977–94)
Japanese data 47 21.6 (2.2) — 97.3 (3.0)
(1975–93)
Y1 Y2 Y3 C
KSY (2000)
GDP Personal income Personal  Retail sales
disposable income
U.S. data — 59.2 (1.5) 64.8 (1.6) 67.5 (4.6)
(1977–94)
Japanese 
Y1 Y2 Y3 C
estimates Prefectural GDP Prefectural Prefectural personal  Total 
personal income disposable income consumption
WLS1
1968 SNA  47 56.0 (2.8) 58.2 (3.2) 90.5 (1.7)
(1975–99)
1993 SNA 47 58.6 (5.9) 63.2 (6.4) 83.7 (2.7)
(1990–2001)
WLS2
1968 SNA  47 55.4 (2.8) 58.9 (2.8) 88.2 (2.8)
(1975–99)
1993 SNA 47 60.6 (5.6) 62.8 (5.6) 76.5 (5.6)
(1990–2001)
Note: Numbers in parentheses show the standard errors for parameters. Estimates for 1968 SNA 
are based on 1,126 unbalanced observations, while estimates for 1993 SNA are based on 517
balanced observations. The balanced observations indicate that all the regions have the same
number of observations, while the unbalanced observations indicate that at least one region
does not have the same number of observations.(2000), 5.6 percent. The 13th row of Table 8 shows the estimates of (100 • K),
(100 • K+T) and (100 • K+T+C) based on the 1993 SNA data from 1990 to 2001.
Compared with the estimate based on the 1968 SNA data, (100 • K) takes a slightly
higher value. One can easily verify that (100 • T) is only 2.2 percent and (100 • C) is
13.7 percent.
The difference between our estimate of (100 • K) and KSY (2003) comes from
the data employed in each study. KSY (2003) collect their data from Sinfonica, while
we estimate our own data. Since a large part of income transfer is already reflected in
personal income, the size of the estimates of (100 • K) based on prefectural personal
income forY2 shown in Table 8 must be greater than those based on prefectural GNP
for Y2 by construction. However, the fourth row of Table 8 shows the estimate of
(100 • K) using prefectural personal income from Sinfonica by KSY (2003) to be
21.6 percent, which is not much different from that based on prefectural GNP forY2.




A. Summary of Results
Overall, our results show that the findings reported by KSY (2003) are not very sensi-
tive to the choice of macroeconomic variables, as long as we use the three data sets
described in Figure 1. However, the choice of prefectural GDP and prefectural personal
income provides a much higher estimate of (100 • K), which could misrepresent the
magnitude of risk sharing. We summarize our estimates of (100 • K), (100 • T), and
(100 • C) in Table 9.
In addition, individual insurance and smoothing effects of income vary significantly
depending on the sample period. Regarding the estimates of (100 • K), results reported
in Figure 2 suggest that the plausible range is 14–36 percent in the 1968 SNA and
15–23 percent in the 1993 SNA and that this is sensitive to the choice of sample period.
Concerning (100 • T), the results in Figure 2 show that the plausible size of (100 • T)
is 3–18 percent in the 1968 SNA and 3–15 percent in the 1993 SNA. As for the 
estimates of (100 • C), the plausible range is 23–80 percent in the 1968 SNA and
49–66 percent in the 1993 SNA. Moreover, the degree of income smoothing instigated
by the changes in savings and dissavings, (100 • C), seems to have fallen dramatically
in the 1990s. The results of subsample estimation show that the reduction in (100 • C)
measured by the 1993 SNA data is not the result of statistical discrepancy.
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10. Note that the difference of economic agents as well as transferred items could affect the estimates. Regarding the
estimates of (100 • T), Mélitz and Zumer (2002) examine the effects of choice of economic agents between the 
personal economic agents (households and private nonprofit institutions serving households) and all the economic
agents (nonfinancial corporations, financial corporations, and the government in addition to households and 
private nonprofit institutions serving households) using Canadian data and the U.S. data. As for the personal 
economic agents, givenY3as personal disposable income andY2 as personal income, (100 • T) based on the U.S. data
is 20.0 percent (Mélitz and Zumer [2002, p. 280, table 3, row 4]) and (100 • T) based on the Canadian data is 
20.9 percent (p. 280, table 3, row 9). Regarding all the economic agents, givenY3 as disposable regional income and
Y2 as regional GNP, (100 • T) based on the U.S. data is 11.8 percent (p. 282, table 4, row 4) and (100 • T) based
on the Canadian data is 12.6 percent (p. 282, table 4, row 9).In the full sample period estimation, our estimates suggest that, in Japan, plausible
estimates are 22.4 percent for (100 • K), 8.1 percent for (100 • T), and 61.8 percent for
(100 • C), based on the 1968 SNA data from 1975 to 1999. Our plausible estimates
are 19.1 percent for (100 • K), 12.8 percent for (100 • T), and 55.4 percent (100 • C),
based on the 1993 SNA data.
B. Interpretations
We offer three interpretations based on the above results. First, regarding the magni-
tude of (100 • K), our estimates based on prefectural GDP and market-price prefectural
income are consistently smaller than those in ASY (1996) (39 percent), which is 
based on the same U.S. state data set. Although our analysis is not based on any 
structural models, one piece of evidence supporting our results is the fact that Japanese
households allocate only 7 percent of their financial assets to stocks and investment
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Table 9  Comparisons of Individual Insurance and Smoothing Effects in Tables 5–8
Capital markets  National  Credit markets
Number of regions 100 • K
government  100 • C
(percent) 100 • T (percent)
(percent)
Y1 Y2 Y3 C
Table 5
Prefectural NDP Prefectural income  Prefectural  Total 
(market-price) disposable income consumption
1968 SNA 41 22.4 8.1 61.8
(1975–99)
1993 SNA 45 19.1 12.8 55.4
(1990–2001)
Y1 Y2 Y3 C
Table 6
Prefectural GDP Prefectural income  Prefectural  Total 
(market-price) disposable income consumption
1968 SNA 41 16.6 8.9 64.6
(1975–99)
1993 SNA 45 10.4 14.2 58.9
(1990–2001)
Y1 Y2 Y3 C
Table 7
Prefectural GDP Prefectural GNP Prefectural Total 
disposable income consumption
1968 SNA 41 21.3 3.7 65.3
(1975–99)
1993 SNA 45 16.3 8.2 59.1
(1990–2001)
Y1 Y2 Y3 C
Table 8
Prefectural GDP Prefectural Personal  Total 
personal income disposable income consumption
1968 SNA 47 55.4 3.5 29.3
(1975–99) 
1993 SNA 47 60.6 2.2 13.7
(1990–2001)
Note: Individual insurance and smoothing effects are estimated from the WLS2 in Tables 5–8 by the
subsequent equations;  T =  K+T −  K,  C =  K+T+C −  K+T.trusts according to the 2001 flow of funds statistics, while U.S. households allocate 
46 percent of their financial assets to stocks and investment trusts.
One may hypothesize that the dominance of bank deposits and cash in Japanese
household assets (54 percent in Japan, 11 percent in the United States) explains the 
relatively weak effects of (100 • K) across regions in Japan. The small value of (100 • K)
seems to counter the argument that a household chooses to hold stocks whose returns
are negatively correlated with the region in which the household is located. One might
cast doubt on such a nice risk hedge by a household. Nonetheless, one may still con-
jecture that bank lending to firms outside the prefecture hedges risk for the household;
thus, the household may not need to rely on capital markets.
One problem for this hypothesis is that, according to KSY (2003), the estimates
of (100 • K) based on 20 Italian regions from 1983 to 1992 is 76.4 percent, and 11
British regions is 41.6 percent based on data from 1978 to 1993. The ratio of bank
deposits and cash in Italian households in 2001 is 17 percent, and that of British
households is 23 percent. These data do not support the hypothesis above.
Another hypothesis that explains the cross-country difference of (100 • K) is that
one country has a stream of regional incomes whose cross-correlations are strong 
and thus the role of capital markets in smoothing cross-regional income variations 
is weak (as in Japan), while the other country has a stream of regional incomes whose
cross-correlations are weak and the role of capital markets in smoothing cross-regional
income variations is strong.
Concerning the estimates based on euro area data, KSY (2004) report that their 
estimates of (100 • K) using GDP and GNP in eight European Union (EU) economies
is 11 percent and their estimates of (100 • K) in euro area economies is 9 percent based
on the data for 1993–2000, while the estimates of (100 • K) based on the data for
1972–92 are small and even negative. The integration of European financial markets
appears to have increased the level of (100 • K), but not close to the Japanese estimates
of 21.3 percent, using GDP and GNP.
Second, regarding the size of (100 • T), the sizes are consistent with the results
based on U.S. data (10–13 percent) such as ASY (1996), KSY (2003), and Mélitz
and Zumer (2002). Although Kletzer and von Hagen (2000) argue that the evidence
regarding the stabilization effects based on fiscal transfers is mixed, it is noteworthy
that within the framework following ASY (1996) and KSY (2003), U.S. and Japanese
idiosyncratic shocks to regional GDP absorbed by the national government (the
inter-regional tax transfer system) are of the same magnitude. Other studies argue
that Japanese fiscal policy has strong distributional effects across regions (see Higo
and Nakagawa [2001]), and that the sustainability of such a distribution from richer
to poorer prefectures is dubious. Note that we simply measure the fraction of 
idiosyncratic shocks to regional GDP absorbed by the national government, and do
not conclude anything about the distributional effects of regional fiscal policy or the 
welfare consequences of these policies.
Regarding the distributional effects of regional fiscal policy based on income
transfer, the statistical methods employed in this paper include public investment
allocated by the national government in the raw data,Y1, and thus do not measure the
distributional effects of fiscal policy through national government public investment.
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regard average prefectural income as a policy target variable to be smoothed.
Therefore, the evidence in this paper should not be taken as policy advice based on
welfare evaluations.
Third, regarding the decline of (100 • C) around the late 1980s followed by the
shift downward in the 1990s, one may conjecture that something happened to the
pattern of household saving and dissaving by credit markets. This might be related to
the asset price bubbles during that period, which widened the dispersion of income
across the prefectures. For example, a shock during the bubble period might have
increased income and consumption simultaneously, motivated by the consumption
of luxury goods. Another interpretation is that there were strong regional shocks
asymmetric to the regions in the 1990s, and thus the overall degree of risk sharing
across regions decreased.
VII. Summary
We used the methodology of KSY (2003) to calculate the degree of insurance among
the Japanese prefectures. Our plausible estimate of the fraction of idiosyncratic shocks 
to prefectural NDP absorbed by inter-regional income insurance through capital 
markets, (100 • K), is 22.4 percent, based on the 1968 SNA data from 1975 to 1999.
The fraction of idiosyncratic shocks to market-price regional prefectural income
absorbed by the national government via the inter-regional tax transfer system,
(100 • T), is 8.1 percent, based on the 1968 SNA data from 1975 to 1999. The 
fraction of idiosyncratic shocks to market-price regional prefectural income absorbed
by the changes in savings and dissavings typically instigated by the credit markets after
the realization of the idiosyncratic shock, (100 • C), is 61.8 percent, based on the 1968
SNA data from 1975 to 1999. Our plausible estimates are in the range of 19.1 percent
for (100 • K), 12.8 percent for (100 • T), and 55.4 percent for (100 • C), based on the
1993 SNA data.
56 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 2005APPENDIX: CONSTRUCTION OF DATA SERIES ON PREFECTURAL
PERSONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME AND 
PREFECTURAL PERSONAL INCOME
The prefectural SNA statistics in Japan do not report prefectural personal income
and prefectural disposable income. We utilize some data series in the Family 
Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) compiled by the Statistics Bureau of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications to estimate prefectural personal
income and prefectural personal disposable income. One may wonder if we can 
conduct the entire study using the data on consumption from the FIES, rather 
than the prefectural SNA statistics. We choose not to do that because prefectural
SNA statistics are more complete and are well-accepted data for most studies.
Indeed, the consumption data in the FIES are supplemented by the other regional
statistics and yield the estimates of the consumption data series in the prefectural
SNA statistics.
We assume that the following three data series in the prefectural SNA statistics
and the FIES are equal throughout our estimation: (1) prefectural income distributed
to households and private nonprofit institutions serving households (hereafter 
personal economic agents) minus employer contributions for social insurance in 
prefectural SNA statistics; (2) income minus social security benefits in the FIES; and
(3) prefectural income minus “other net transfers” to personal economic agents other
than payment of direct taxes. We begin by estimating prefectural personal disposable
income, and then proceed to the estimation of prefectural personal income.
A. Prefectural Personal Disposable Income
By definition, prefectural personal disposable income is equivalent to prefectural 
disposable income distributed to personal economic agents minus employer contri-
butions for social insurance. We should be able to obtain a consistent data series on
prefectural personal disposable income with the following equation: 
(Prefectural personal disposable income) = (prefectural disposable income 
[households]) + (prefectural disposable income [private nonprofit institutions
serving households]) − (employer contributions for social insurance). 
However, the prefectural SNA statistics have many missing observations in the data
series of employer contributions for social insurance. We cannot estimate the data on
prefectural personal disposable income using the definition explained above.
To cope with this problem, we estimate prefectural personal disposable income
utilizing some data series in the FIES. First, we estimate prefectural personal dispos-
able income under an additional assumption that the definition of disposable income
in both the prefectural SNA statistics and the FIES are roughly consistent. Under this
additional assumption, we estimate the ratio of (prefectural income distributed to
personal economic agents minus employer contributions for social insurance; Y
spa) to
(prefectural disposable income distributed to personal economic agents minus
employer contributions for social insurance; D
spa) in prefectural SNA statistics by the
ratio of (income minus social security benefits; Y
H) to (disposable income; D
H) in
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spa in











where subscript t and i denote time and region, respectively.
Second, we make an additional adjustment to our D
spa series following Ito and
Watanabe (2004). As the FIES covers workers’ households only, the ratio of Y
H to
D
H might be biased from the ratio of all households in each prefecture. Therefore,
D
spa estimated above might also be biased. To cope with this bias, we utilize data from


















sna denote the national counterparts of Y
spa and D
spa in the national
SNA statistics, respectively. In this adjustment, the average bias in D
spa/Y
spa derived
from the bias in D
H/Y
H is corrected by the national counterpart. We use the data
series on adjusted D
spa for our estimate of prefectural personal disposable income.
B. Prefectural Personal Income
By definition, prefectural personal income is equivalent to prefectural income distrib-
uted to personal economic agents minus employer contributions for social insurance
plus “other net transfers” to personal economic agents other than payment of taxes.
We should be able to obtain a consistent data series on prefectural personal income
based on the following formula: 
(Prefectural personal income) = (prefectural income [households]) + (prefectural
income [private nonprofit institutions serving households]) − (employer 
contributions for social insurance) + (“other net transfers” to personal economic
agents other than payment of taxes).
However, since the prefectural SNA statistics do not report the data series on “other
net transfers” and “payment of taxes” for personal economic agents, we cannot use the
above formula to estimate prefectural personal income. To cope with this problem, we
estimate prefectural personal income based on the following relationship: 
(Prefectural personal income) = (prefectural personal disposable income) +
(payment of direct taxes by personal economic agents). 
Specifically, we first estimate the payment of direct taxes by personal economic agents
using the data series in the FIES. We add that series to our own estimates of prefectural
personal disposable income to obtain prefectural personal income.
58 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 2005Specifically, we first estimate payment of direct taxes by personal economic agents
under the assumption that the payment of direct taxes in both the prefectural SNA
statistics and the FIES are consistent. Under this additional assumption, we estimate
the ratio of Y
spa to (payment of direct taxes by households; T
spa) in the prefectural
SNA statistics, and the ratio of Y
H to (direct taxes; T
H) by the ratio reported in the
FIES. We estimateT




























sna denotes payment of direct taxes by households in the national SNA statistics.
Second, we add our estimates of payment of direct taxes by personal economic
agents to the estimated prefectural personal disposable income to obtain our own
estimates of personal income (PI ):
PIit = adjusted D
spa
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